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ii Table of Commander who will actually execute the NEO when it is likely to be assigned?" Given the NEO description in the Tiger Response AAR, one should conclude that any GCC deliberate planning now will mitigate some of the danger and improve the time line and the JTF's position at the outset of a volatile situation. It is clearly understood that deliberate prior planning can mitigate costly lessons encountered in reaction to a crisis. This paper will highlight the operational factors in the theater, and illustrate how they shape options for the future NEOs assigned to AFRICOM. An analysis of current information will underscore why DOD will be tasked to evacuate American citizens again in the AFRICOM AOR. That will be followed by an overview of key points of NEO doctrine juxtaposed with current GCC and Component preparations for those operations. A contrast of the proposed AFRICOM composition and posture with that of the traditional GCCs' will clarify AFRICOM's space-time-force challenge at the outset of its inevitable NEO(s). This paper will propose recommendations for AFRICOM to conduct deliberate NEO planning and war gaming that will reduce portions of the eventually-assigned JFC's required planning time and actual time for movement of personnel in the NEO execution.
One up-front caveat for this paper is that my proposals will be limited to permissive NEOs. My analysis will reference non-permissive operations, but the necessary discussion of forces for non-permissive NEOs is beyond the scope of this Joint Military Operational Art research paper.
BACKGROUND
One of the best places to begin a discussion on or an analysis of any military operation is in joint doctrine, which defines NEO as:
Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating US citizens, Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, and designated host nation (HN) and third country nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster. 4 Given that NEOs are usually triggered by international crises that place American
Citizens overseas in peril, they create drama that brings intense media attention and public focus even if only for a short time. Though individuals not directly involved with particular
NEOs are rarely able to recall an operational name, many people can identify issues surrounding the operation long after its completion.
As an example, Operation URGENT FURY may not be a name recognized by most Americans, many do recall firefights throughout the islands of Granada in October 1983.
They remember the relief of the American citizen evacuees, their families, and the nation as a whole upon their repatriation. Many will also recall that criticism of the operation continued both in the media and throughout the Congress long after the participating units were engaged in other activities elsewhere throughout the world. The point when a DOS evacuation escalates to a joint, interagency NEO is always a crisis and it is still clear that neither planners nor executers will have sufficient opportunity to thoroughly plan. U.S. embassies in Africa, and therefore AFRICOM, will have to execute
NEOs in the coming years, so it is critical that AFRICOM prepares as much as possible now.
MISSION INITIATION & MISSION ANALYSIS
As with any military operation, the first step, "Planning Initiation" occurs when "an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed." The primary consideration in the second step of the Joint Operational Planning Procedure, "Mission Analysis" is to determine the national strategic end state, and to identify the specific military objectives required to support that end state. 10 Unlike the more open- Though not all the news in the Index is bad for AFRICOM, unfortunately, three of the four countries leading the Index trend downward were Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, and
Niger.
14 Unstable countries, often clustered in volatile regions of AFRICOM's AOR are going to be, for the foreseeable future, areas where the U.S. is going to have to respond to crises by evacuating its citizens in a NEO. Though NEO may not have been a topic of consideration, the U.S. leadership recognized the significance of the "failed state" as early as 2002 when the National Security Strategy recognized that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones." 15 We also have a history of NEOs in the AOR, with U.S.
military conducting fifteen NEOs from African nations. 16 Continuing with the analysis of AFRICOM's space, planners on the GCC and the JTF staffs must plan to transport evacuees from the country-in-crisis to a safe haven. The choice between air, land, or sea, will more often be determined by operational limitations than by the JFC's preferences.
The limitation throughout vast areas of Africa, especially in the most unstable areas is infrastructure. Land routes will rarely be an option because few roads are adequate for rapid, large movements of personnel from a crisis to a suitable safe haven for further transport.
Though there are highways between some major cities within a number of the countries, they are seldom completed between capitals or major cities between different countries. As an Action Officer on a SIXTH FLEET task force, I and my fellow-planners encountered logistical operational limitations on numerous occasions resulting from the underdeveloped infrastructure throughout much of Africa. Other government agencies and commercial organizations we worked with contended with the same issues.
Air transport has been the primary evacuation mode for a number of NEOs in Africa and other locations around the world, but neither the GCC nor the JFC should default to that without closely evaluating space-force limitations (to be discussed later in this paper) or other unpredictable, possible 'show-stopper' limitations such as lack of suitable aviation fuel.
A recent example is a Sixth Fleet delegation on a Theater Security Cooperation trip in the Gulf of Guinea was delayed for over a day, along with all other commercial aircraft in Ghana's capital, Accra last summer.
It is readily apparent, however, that airlift would be the only option for some of the central, land-locked regions of the continent. Airlift was the only means possible in the 1996 NEO from Rwanda, and was the chosen transportation from Liberia in 1992. Integral to that assessment would be the characterization of the operational environment for the NEO. The least complicated, lowest impact would be a "Permissive Environment," which would not require combat forces to support the evacuation. The other end of the spectrum would be a "Hostile Environment" that could be defined by localized civil disorder, regional factionalism, or hostile enemy action. This would require insertion of a combat or security forces that would necessarily range in size and complexity with the number of evacuees. An "Uncertain Environment" is defined between those, which may require insertion of security personnel, or where there is concern of escalation.
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COURSE of ACTION DEVELOPMENT & COMPARISON
With a clear understanding of mission tasking and military end state, and an analysis of the operational factors and limitations, the next step in the planning process is Course of Action (COA) Development and Comparison.
Part of that process incorporates counterarguments, which segues into addressing counterarguments to thesis of this paper. One could propose that much of this planning has already been initiated for NEOs in several venues; that COAs effectively exist in American embassy Emergency Action Plans (EAPs) that are reviewed by the respective GCC for their locations. 22 One might state that if the crisis triggering a particular evacuation corresponds with those preset, reviewed and vetted plans, then the GCC and JTF would merely be required to execute with the assets on hand that would match the plan. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
If we clearly understand the operational factors that AFRICOM will face in a NEO,
we know there will be no opportunity to change the space, and events in the crisis itself may further limit our space as demonstrated in Lebanon. We know that U.S. forces will be limited, and there won't be time, given the tyranny of distance to appreciably change them in response to an unforeseen crisis. One factor we can improve prior to the crisis is our time.
U.S. planners can minimize operational limitations now by conducting some of the critical detailed planning regionally that can bring commercial assets to bear locally.
Commercial shipping contracts are researched with market surveys, prepared and signed by MSC on behalf of TRANSCOM where cost-effective. Understanding that ESG and MEU(SOC) presence is highly unlikely to coincide with the next AFRICOM NEO, detailed regional market surveys must be conducted now as a force-shaping measure for the JTF that will be tasked in the future. 29 A key aspect of COA analysis is wargaming, when strengths and weaknesses of capabilities and plans are evaluated against opposing factors ranging from environmental elements to enemy actions. Opposing factors for a permissive NEO could be entirely environmental; degraded infrastructure, or uncontrolled civil unrest that has disrupted normal transportation and communications facilities. Early research for this paper revealed that a localized NEO has never been the central point of a wargame at the Naval War College.
NEOs are often a factor in an operation or a campaign, but they are discussed as a possible requirement or noted as an action completed. 30 War games can illuminate issues now that AFRICOM planners and JTF staffs would likely encounter in a number of rapidly developing localized and regional crises that could require a NEO. A point of focus should be simultaneous crises in both EUCOM and AFRICOM, given that the Component Commands with the personnel and equipment will likely be simultaneously supporting both GCCs. This list could very well translate as an effective measure of effectiveness for theater and regional cooperation programs.
In summary, AFRICOM is a challenging re-focus of the U.S. on a continent with failed states clustered in regions of serious instability. Unpredictable, volatile disruptions of civil order in these states will necessitate evacuation of American citizens from crisis areas with continued regularity. The magnitude of some of these evacuations will require DOD to assist DOS with NEOs.
SUMMARY
Though no planning can predict all of the crises that could trigger a NEO, AFRICOM should utilize the wargaming capabilities of the various DOD institutions in order to identify operational weaknesses and limitations and to more effectively mitigate them.
With the clear recognition that no transportation option has been optimal for all previous NEOs, it is understood that planners will have to consider and develop a depth of options for future operations. They must, however, learn from recent experience that reliance on traditional, forward-deployed military forces will significantly increase time-lines in an AOR constrained by the tyranny of distance. Short-notice, contracted commercial passenger transport was an extremely effective force-multiplier in the recent Lebanon NEO, and must be explored in AFRICOM's AOR. AFRICOM planners have to work with TRANSCOM and its components to research and retain those options now in order to minimize the time delay for the assigned JTF later.
An important focal point for that planning would be an AFRICOM JTF-Consequence Management (NEO) to coordinate the planning efforts and bridge the gaps between DOS and DOD, as well as those between the GCC's Component Commands. Though AFRICOM has a myriad of challenges and staff requirements already, it should devote staff effort now to be adequately prepared for highly-likely, short-fused, crisis-driven NEOs.
This paper has focused on the challenges facing Africa and AFRICOM, and has provided several recommendations for consideration. One additional point of consideration is that the very unconventional structure proposed for AFRICOM could be one of the most important assets for addressing the complications inherent in a NEO. Having reviewed AARs and other post-operation documentation on numerous NEOs, one of the most common problems occur at the DOS-DOD interface. AFRICOM has been planned as an interagency organization, with a senior executive DOS representative as one of the GCC deputies.
AFRICOM is interagency, which should provide the impetus for innovative interagency solutions to volatile, complex crises.
